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86 
WHY GOVERNANCE MIGHT WORK  
IN MUTUAL FUNDS† 
Michael C. Schouten* 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates 
L.P. has highlighted the potential for agency conflicts in mutual 
funds, whose advisors have the de facto power to award themselves 
high fees. While the surrounding debate has focused on the extent to 
which market competition replaces the need for fee litigation, there 
appears to be a growing consensus that fund governance, through 
the use of voice, is unlikely to be effective. The use of voice is com-
monly said to be hampered by collective action problems.  More 
recently, scholars have argued that it is further weakened by the 
easy availability of exit. Yet while the easy availability of exit may 
discourage the use of voice, the easy availability of exit may also 
encourage voice. This Essay explains how the easy availability of 
exit from mutual funds encourages shareholder voice, at least in 
theory. By analyzing the responsibility of 401(k) plan fiduciaries to 
prudently select investment options that plan participants can 
choose from, this Essay also explains why mutual fund governance 
might work in practice.  
I. Introduction 
Nearly half a century ago, Congress adopted the Investment Company 
Act because of its concern with the potential for agency conflicts in invest-
ment funds, including mutual funds. The Act gave shareholders the right to 
vote on adviser fees and directors, thereby opening the door to governance 
through the use of voice. Shareholder activism in mutual funds nevertheless 
remains uncommon, which is widely attributed to collective action prob-
lems. Because shareholders in mutual funds are typically household 
investors, their stakes are said to be too small to make activism worthwhile. 
In a recent article, John Morley and Quinn Curtis offer a deeper explanation 
for fund shareholders’ passivity, arguing that the use of voice is discouraged 
by the easy availability of exit—the ability to redeem one’s shares in the 
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fund.1 This argument is based on Albert Hirschman’s influential book, Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty,2 yet it fails to fully capture the subtle implications of 
Hirschman’s work. After all, the easy availability of exit may also encour-
age voice. This Essay explains how the easy availability of exit from mutual 
funds encourages shareholder voice, at least in theory. By analyzing the re-
sponsibility of 401(k) plan fiduciaries to prudently select investment options 
that plan participants can choose from, this Essay also explains why mutual 
fund governance might work in practice. 
Before getting to the heart of the matter, it is useful to clarify the mean-
ing of “voice” in the context of fund governance. Hirschman defined voice 
as any attempt “to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state 
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the manage-
ment directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the 
intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of 
actions and protests.”3 Morley and Curtis apply a similarly broad definition 
that encompasses both voting to lower fees or change managers, as well as 
putting pressure on the fund’s directors (“lobbying”). Their analysis focuses 
on voting, and shows that mutual fund shareholders can be expected to con-
sistently prefer exit to voting. By contrast, the act of putting pressure on the 
fund’s directors—or directly on the fund adviser—features less prominently 
in the analysis. As we will see, it is this informal use of voice that holds 
promise as a tool of fund governance. 
II. The Interaction Between Exit and Voice 
Clearly, the easy availability of exit may discourage voice: If one can 
easily exit, why bother to use voice? The notion that the easy availability of 
exit may encourage voice therefore seems counterintuitive at first. However, 
as Hirschman explains, “The chances for voice to function effectively as a 
recuperation mechanism are appreciably strengthened if voice is backed up 
by the threat of exit, whether it is made openly or whether the possibility of 
exit is merely well understood to be an element in the situation by all con-
cerned.” As a result, while “the willingness to develop and use the voice 
mechanism is reduced by exit, [the] ability to use it with effect is increased 
by it.” The probability that the use of voice will be effective obviously plays 
an important role in deciding whether to exit or use voice. If exit is easily 
available, this makes the threat of exit more credible; this in turn results in a 
higher probability that the use of voice will be effective. Viewed this way, 
easy availability of exit makes voice more attractive. 
As an example of this peculiar interaction between exit and voice, con-
sider the dilemma faced by a corporate shareholder who is dissatisfied with 
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 2. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice And Loyalty: Responses To Decline In Firms, 
Organizations, And States (1970). 
 3. Id. at 30. 
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the way her portfolio firm compensates its executives. Such a shareholder 
can either exit or use voice. The formal way to use voice is by voting; the 
recent Dodd-Frank Act grants shareholders say-on-pay, albeit the outcome 
of the vote is not legally binding. The informal way to use voice is by com-
municating concerns directly to management, a real option to institutional 
shareholders: studies have found that as many as 55 percent of institutional 
investors are willing to engage directly in discussions with the firm’s execu-
tives.4 In both cases, management will have discretion in deciding whether 
or not to take measures alleviating the shareholder’s concerns. The probabil-
ity that management will do so, that is the probability that the use of voice 
will be effective, depends in part on how credible the threat of exit is. Man-
agement will generally want to prevent dissatisfied shareholders from 
exiting, given the downward pressure on the share price this may cause. A 
decrease in the share price, after all, negatively affects the variable compen-
sation many executives receive.5 Moreover, a decrease in the share price 
increases the probability of a hostile takeover.6 
At first glance, the threat of exit appears credible given how easily inves-
tors can sell their corporate shares in liquid markets. However, a significant 
downside to exiting (or “switching” from one portfolio firm to another) is 
that the cash amount that a shareholder receives for selling her shares in the 
market may not suffice, and is indeed unlikely to suffice, to purchase a sub-
stitute share that is expected to yield higher returns. This mitigates the threat 
of exit and therefore makes it easier for management to ignore the share-
holder’s concerns. The fact that sale prices in corporations reflect expected 
returns thus lowers the probability that the use of voice will be effective and, 
all else being equal, makes voice less attractive. 
III. The Threat of Exit in Mutual Funds 
Sale prices in mutual funds, by contrast, do not reflect expected returns. 
Rather than selling their shares on the market, shareholders in mutual funds 
who are dissatisfied with the fund advisor’s compensation level can redeem 
their shares and receive a cash amount equal to a pro rata share of the fund’s 
assets (after debts and liabilities), which is called the net asset value per 
share (“NAV”). This cash amount should suffice to buy a substitute share in 
a different mutual fund with the same NAV but with higher expected returns 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See Joseph A. McCahery, Laura T. Starks & Zacharias Sautner, Behind the Scenes: The 
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, at 13 (2010). AFA 2011 Denver Meet-
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 5. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activ-
ism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2245 (2009) (developing a theoretical model that 
shows that the threat of exit by a large shareholder, via its potential negative effect on executive 
compensation, generally discourages executives from taking actions that are undesirable from the 
shareholders’ perspective). 
 6. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 
110 (1965) (discussing the market for corporate control); Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Institutional 
Stock Sales and Takeovers: The Disciplinary Role of Voting with Your Feet (2008) (finding that block 
sales increase the probability of a takeover).  
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because of lower fees. As a result, shareholders whose concerns are ignored 
do not face a similar barrier to exiting as shareholders in corporations do, 
and the threat of exit is very credible. Fund advisors will generally want to 
prevent dissatisfied shareholders from exiting, as their compensation is usu-
ally tied to the amount of assets under management. All else being equal, 
this should make fund advisors more responsive to shareholders’ concerns, 
and this, in turn, makes voice more attractive. 
Importantly, the significance of a dissatisfied shareholder’s threat of exit 
depends not only on how credible the threat is, but also on the number of 
shares that the shareholder would redeem. Given that shareholders in mutual 
funds are typically household investors, this number is generally low. The 
fund advisor, therefore, would not need to bother when a shareholder infor-
mally voices concerns, unless of course there is reason to believe that the 
concerns are tacitly shared by a wider group of shareholders. Thus, share-
ownership dispersion acts as a double-edged sword: it discourages voice not 
only by creating collective action problems, but also by diluting the threat of 
exit and hence the likelihood that voice will be effective. 
IV. Why Governance Might Work in Mutual Funds 
Even if fund managers may be inclined to ignore the voice of individual 
investors, they can be expected to heed the voice of 401(k) plan fiduciaries. 
By 2009, no less than 68 percent of mutual fund investors owned funds in-
side an employer-sponsored pension plan.7 The employer typically appoints 
a fiduciary who has a duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 “to prudently select and monitor” investment options that par-
ticipants in the plan can choose from. Under existing law, this duty does not 
require fiduciaries to minimize fees associated with investment options.8 
However, the issue is high on the agenda of the U.S. Department of Labor, 
which has repeatedly stated that fiduciaries should monitor fees9 and has 
recently adopted a rule requiring fiduciaries to disclose information regard-
ing fees.10 While these disclosures are intended to enable plan participants to 
make their own investment decisions, they are likely to increase scrutiny of 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Investment Company Fact Book 84 (2010). 
 8. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “nothing 
in ERISA requires every fiduciary to scour the market to find and offer the cheapest possible fund”); 
see also John M. Vine, Prudent Investing, 38 Tax Mgmt. Comp. Planning J. 1, 5 (2010) (stating 
that “ERISA does not require a fiduciary to make the best or most profitable investment decisions”); 
Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1985 
(2010) (stating that “[e]xisting law does not require an employer or plan provider to maximize re-
turns or minimize fees”). 
 9. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Understanding retirement Plan Fees and Expenses 2 
(2004) (stating that “evaluating plan fees and expenses associated with . . .  investment options . . . 
are an important part of a fiduciary’s responsibility” and that this responsibility is ongoing); id. at 3 
(stating that “employers should pay attention to [fees for investment managers, such as mutual fund 
managers]”); see also U.S. Dept. of Labor, A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees 3 (2010) (stating that 
employers must “monitor investment alternatives . . . once selected to see that they continue to be 
appropriate choices”). 
 10. 29 CFR § 2550.404a-5(d)(1)(iv). 
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plan fiduciaries’ selection of investment options.11 This may cause plan fidu-
ciaries to pay more attention to fees and to oppose fee increases through the 
informal use of voice, backed by the significant threat of removing the fund 
from the plan’s menu of investment options and replacing it with another 
mutual fund or a different type of fund altogether.12 
In fact, 401(k) plan fiduciaries may already be opposing fee increases 
through the informal use of voice—we simply don’t know. After all, when 
plan fiduciaries voice their concerns by communicating directly with the 
fund’s directors or with the fund adviser, their activism remains unknown to 
the public. “Behind the scenes” activism by plan fiduciaries thus is an inter-
esting avenue for future research, especially in light of mounting evidence 
of behind the scenes activism by corporate shareholders.13  
V. Conclusion 
As the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates 
L.P. reminds us, agency conflicts in mutual funds are potentially signifi-
cant.14 The question of whether fund governance through the use of voice 
works therefore is an important one. Activism in mutual funds appears to be 
uncommon, which scholars have sought to explain by pointing to collective 
action problems and the easy availability of exit. However, as the preceding 
analysis has shown, the easy availability of exit may actually encourage 
voice, at least when it is expressed through informal channels. To complete 
the explanation of shareholders’ passivity, one needs to take into account the 
fact that the high degree of fund-ownership dispersion discourages share-
holder voice not only by creating collective action problems but also by 
diluting the threat of exit and, consequently, the likelihood that the use of 
voice will be effective. 
By focusing on the threat of exit, it also becomes clear that whereas the 
use of voice by individual shareholders is unlikely to be effective, the use of 
voice by 401(k) plan fiduciaries is much more likely to be effective. While 
such fiduciaries do not hold shares themselves (and therefore are not entitled 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See John F. Wasik, Pump Up a 401(k) by Lowering the Fees, N.Y. Times (Sept. 15, 2010) 
(suggesting that the Department of Labor’s new rules should enable plan participants to compare 
fees and hold employers accountable for their selection of investment options). 
 12. See Jane Hodges, Cheaper Choice in 401(k)s, Wall St. J. (Aug. 2, 2010) (describing 
how plans are increasingly offering collective trust funds, which typically have lower expenses than 
mutual funds); see also Deloitte Consulting LLP & The International Society of Certi-
fied Employee Benefit Specialists, 401 (k) Benchmarking Survey 28 (2009) (finding that 72 
percent of plan sponsors who responded to the survey handle underperforming funds by replacing 
them and that 39 percent replaced a fund due to poor performance within the last year). 
 13. See e.g., Joseph A. McCahery, Laura T. Starks & Zacharias Sautner, Behind the Scenes: 
The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (2010); AFA 2011 Denver Meet-
ings Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571046; Institutional Shareholder 
Services, The State of Engagement between U.S. Corporations and Shareholders (2011); 
M. Weisbach, W. Carleton & J. Nelson, The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance 
through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. Fin. 1335 (1998). 
 14. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (addressing the issue of fund advisors’ 
liability for charging excessive fees). 
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to vote), they are responsible for selecting investment options that plan par-
ticipants can choose from, and for doing so in a prudent manner. This means 
they have the ability to, and may even be obliged to, remove from their 
menu of investment options any mutual fund whose advisor ignores con-
cerns about excessive fees. The implicit or explicit threat of such removal is 
what makes the informal use of voice by plan fiduciaries a powerful govern-
ance mechanism, the full potential of which is yet to be unleashed. 
Governance in mutual funds, then, might work after all. 
